Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Collective choice with endogenous reference outcome
zbMATH Open document ID: 1155.91317
author: Hannu Vartiainen
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2007-02-13T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10138/16885
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 5125312
zbMATH Keywords: no disagreement
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining theory
zbMATH Keywords: axioms
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2153188212
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2005.12.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5125312