Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1154.91419
author: Lixin Ye
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2007-02-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5125313
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: two-stage auctions
zbMATH Keywords: indicative bidding
zbMATH Keywords: efficient entry
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2005.12.004
OpenAlex ID: W2071854262
cites work: Equilibria in open common value auctions
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cites work: Optimal Auction Design
cites work: A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
cites work: A Model of Rational Competitive Bidding
cites work: Competitive bidding with entry costs
cites work: Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
cites work: A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2005.12.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5125313