Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods
zbMATH Open document ID: 1134.91382
author: Murat Atlamaz
author: Bettina Klaus
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2007-02-14T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 59804.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5126675
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2106227664
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-006-0159-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5126675