On `informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On `informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1276.91013
author: Hans Reijnierse
author: Mark Voorneveld
author: Peter Borm
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2007-03-06T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 5131207
zbMATH Keywords: bimatrix game
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium selection
zbMATH Keywords: leakage of information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-005-0076-0
OpenAlex ID: W2037843723
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-005-0076-0
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5131207