Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs
zbMATH Open document ID: 1142.91343
author: Josef Hofbauer
author: William H. Sandholm
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2007-03-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 37N40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A15
zbMATH DE Number: 5132561
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary game theory
zbMATH Keywords: convergence to approximate Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium selection
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2005.05.011
OpenAlex ID: W2154983078
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2005.05.011
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5132561