On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
zbMATH Open document ID: 1142.91474
author: James Schummer
author: Rakesh V. Vohra
author: Sven De Vries
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2007-03-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 5132563
zbMATH Keywords: Vickrey auctions
zbMATH Keywords: combinatorial auctions
zbMATH Keywords: duality
zbMATH Keywords: primal-dual algorithm
zbMATH Keywords: subgradient algorithm
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2005.07.010
OpenAlex ID: W2116764051
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2005.07.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5132563