Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
zbMATH Open document ID: 1142.91492
author: Debasis Mishra
author: David C. Parkes
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2007-03-09T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3996850
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C47
zbMATH DE Number: 5132574
zbMATH Keywords: combinatorial auctions
zbMATH Keywords: multi-item auctions
zbMATH Keywords: primal-dual algorithm
zbMATH Keywords: universal competitive equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: Vickrey auctions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2129885111
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2005.09.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5132574