On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1142.91484
author: Matthew O. Jackson
author: Ilan Kremer
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2007-03-09T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79618/
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 5132582
zbMATH Keywords: auction
zbMATH Keywords: competition
zbMATH Keywords: discriminatory auction
zbMATH Keywords: asymptotic efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: efficient markets
zbMATH Keywords: efficient market hypothesis
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2064250017
cites work: Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
cites work: The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment
cites work: The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue
cites work: A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
cites work: Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
cites work: The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
cites work: A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2004.06.011
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5132582