Rational ignorance and voting behavior
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Rational ignorance and voting behavior
zbMATH Open document ID: 1221.91025
author: César Martinelli
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2007-03-15T00:00:00Z
review text: In a previous paper by the author, a pivotal voter model in which it was predicted that in equilibria with information acquisition every voter was nearly uninformed, and the aggregate cost information acquisition was declined to zero when information aggregation was successful was formulated and analyzed. The model in this paper, per contra, predicts that there will be a minority of voters with much better information that the rest, and that the aggregate cost of information acquisition will grow unboundedly when information aggregation is more successful.
reviewed by: Sergei Georgievich Zhuravlev
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 5134046
zbMATH Keywords: voting theory
zbMATH Keywords: rational ignorance
Wikidata QID: Q56226518
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-006-0051-4
OpenAlex ID: W2154788577
cites work: Q3999383
cites work: Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
cites work: Would rational voters acquire costly information?
cites work: Committee Design with Endogenous Information
DOI: 10.1007/S00182-006-0051-4
DBLP publication ID: journals/ijgt/Martinelli07
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5134046