The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
zbMATH Open document ID: 1131.91014
author: Adam Brandenburger
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2007-04-26T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 03B42
zbMATH DE Number: 5146192
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-006-0061-2
OpenAlex ID: W2163254247
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-006-0061-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5146192