Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction
zbMATH Open document ID: 1114.91043
author: Claudio Mezzetti
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2007-04-26T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/4431
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5146552
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2071208786
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-006-0104-8
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5146552