Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes
zbMATH Open document ID: 1388.91015
author: Federico Quartieri
author: Ryusuke Shinohara
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2015-11-17T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6509490
zbMATH Keywords: coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto dominance
zbMATH Keywords: strategic substitutes
zbMATH Keywords: externalities
zbMATH Keywords: generalized aggregative games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-014-0452-8
OpenAlex ID: W2044782880
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-014-0452-8
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6509490