Limits to rational learning
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Limits to rational learning
zbMATH Open document ID: 1369.91028
author: Yehuda Levy
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2015-11-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 6511890
zbMATH Keywords: rational learning
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1575024552
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2015.08.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6511890