Expert advice to a voting body
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Expert advice to a voting body
zbMATH Open document ID: 1369.91050
author: Keith E. Schnakenberg
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2015-11-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6511895
zbMATH Keywords: signaling
zbMATH Keywords: cheap talk
zbMATH Keywords: social choice
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2015.08.005
OpenAlex ID: W3123220514
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2015.08.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6511895