A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
zbMATH Open document ID: 1369.91142
author: Qinggong Wu
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2015-11-19T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 6511901
zbMATH Keywords: two-sided matching
zbMATH Keywords: marriage problem
zbMATH Keywords: stable matchings
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2015.09.005
OpenAlex ID: W2152865367
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2015.09.005
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6511901