Matching markets under (in)complete information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Matching markets under (in)complete information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1330.91150
author: Lars Ehlers
author: Jordi Massó
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2015-11-23T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/182476
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 6512910
zbMATH Keywords: many-to-one matching market
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2007071308
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2015.01.008
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6512910