An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
zbMATH Open document ID: 1330.91087
author: Dieter Balkenborg
author: Miltiadis Makris
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2015-11-23T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: BalkenborgMakris.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B30
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 6512933
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: informed principal
zbMATH Keywords: common values
zbMATH Keywords: neutral optimum
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2052671165
Wikidata QID: Q57937040
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DBLP publication ID: journals/jet/BalkenborgM15
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2015.02.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6512933