Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1330.91114
author: N. E. Zubov
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2015-11-23T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/247289
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6512942
zbMATH Keywords: renegotiation
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: contract
zbMATH Keywords: commitment
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2047084769
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2014.12.001
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6512942