Strive to be first or avoid being last: an experiment on relative performance incentives
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strive to be first or avoid being last: an experiment on relative performance incentives
zbMATH Open document ID: 1347.91104
author: E. Glenn Dutcher
author: Loukas Balafoutas
author: Florian Lindner
author: Dmitry Ryvkin
author: Matthias Sutter
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2015-12-02T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/120981
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 6515251
zbMATH Keywords: tournament
zbMATH Keywords: winner
zbMATH Keywords: loser
zbMATH Keywords: contract
zbMATH Keywords: experiment
zbMATH Keywords: learning
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1955371898
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2015.08.008
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6515251