Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
zbMATH Open document ID: 1347.91154
author: Andreas Kleiner
author: Moritz A. Drexl
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2015-12-02T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74639
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6515258
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: bilateral trade
zbMATH Keywords: Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem
zbMATH Keywords: budget balance
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2197115769
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2015.10.009
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6515258