Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: experimental evidence
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: experimental evidence
zbMATH Open document ID: 1347.91109
author: Melanie Parravano
author: Odile Poulsen
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2015-12-02T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
zbMATH DE Number: 6515261
zbMATH Keywords: coordination
zbMATH Keywords: stake size
zbMATH Keywords: payoff asymmetry
zbMATH Keywords: labels
zbMATH Keywords: focal point
describes a project that uses: hroot
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2015.05.001
OpenAlex ID: W2235866584
Wikidata QID: Q56687822
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2015.05.001
DBLP publication ID: journals/geb/ParravanoP15
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6515261