Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1330.91091
author: Justin Burkett
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2015-12-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6521274
zbMATH Keywords: auctions
zbMATH Keywords: budget constraints
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2015.03.010
OpenAlex ID: W1991710782
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2015.03.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6521274