Efficient assignment with interdependent values
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Efficient assignment with interdependent values
zbMATH Open document ID: 1330.91149
author: Yeon-Koo Che
author: Jinwoo Kim
author: Fuhito Kojima
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2015-12-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 6521277
zbMATH Keywords: house allocation problem
zbMATH Keywords: efficient assignment
zbMATH Keywords: interdependent values
zbMATH Keywords: ex-post implementation
zbMATH Keywords: approximate ex-post implementation
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian implementation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2015.03.008
OpenAlex ID: W1990227282
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2015.03.008
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6521277