Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction
zbMATH Open document ID: 1330.91007
author: A. Pavan
author: Xavier Vives
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2015-12-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91-06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 00B25
zbMATH DE Number: 6521299
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2015.05.001
OpenAlex ID: W2201226501
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Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction (cites work)
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Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction (DOI)
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2015.05.001