A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule
zbMATH Open document ID: 1368.91017
author: Juan J. Vidal-Puga
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2015-12-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6522252
zbMATH Keywords: ordinal bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2015.07.008
OpenAlex ID: W2135120041
cites work: Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
cites work: Multilateral bargaining problems
cites work: Bargaining conventions
cites work: Trust in triads: Effects of exit, control, and learning.
cites work: Bargaining with ordinal and cardinal players
cites work: Bargaining and Value
cites work: Odd man out: The proposal-making model
cites work: Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
cites work: Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
cites work: Ordinal invariance in multicoalitional bargaining.
cites work: Egalitarianism in ordinal bargaining: the Shapley-Shubik rule
cites work: Nash bargaining in ordinal environments
cites work: Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information
cites work: Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation
cites work: Subgame Perfect Implementation
cites work: Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
cites work: The Bargaining Problem
cites work: Two-Person Cooperative Games
cites work: Bargaining with an agenda
cites work: Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
cites work: An ordinal Shapley value for economic environments
cites work: Axiomatic models of bargaining
cites work: An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players.
cites work: A family of ordinal solutions to bargaining problems with many players
cites work: Non-cooperative implementation of the nucleolus: The 3-player case
cites work: Q5623557
cites work: Q3843226
cites work: Q3624168
DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.07.008
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6522252