Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Complexity of manipulation and bribery in judgment aggregation for uniform premise-based quota rules
zbMATH Open document ID: 1331.91063
author: Dorothea Baumeister
author: Gábor Erdélyi
author: Olivia J. Erdélyi
author: Jörg Rothe
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2015-12-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6522435
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2015.03.006
OpenAlex ID: W2014337128
cites work: Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks
cites work: Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
cites work: The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
cites work: Q5282956
cites work: Computational Aspects of Manipulation and Control in Judgment Aggregation
cites work: Computational Aspects of Approval Voting
cites work: How Hard Is it to Bribe the Judges? A Study of the Complexity of Bribery in Judgment Aggregation
cites work: Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
cites work: Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
cites work: The complexity of probabilistic lobbying
cites work: Fair Division under Ordinal Preferences: Computing Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Goods
cites work: Fair division of indivisible items
cites work: On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
cites work: When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
cites work: Barriers to Manipulation in Voting
cites work: Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems
cites work: Judgment aggregation and agenda manipulation
cites work: Q4503944
cites work: Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
cites work: Swap Bribery
cites work: Judgment Aggregation
cites work: Complexity of Judgment Aggregation
cites work: How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
cites work: Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
cites work: On miniaturized problems in parameterized complexity theory
cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
cites work: Search versus Decision for Election Manipulation Problems
cites work: Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
cites work: The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review
cites work: Q3617420
cites work: Methods for distance-based judgment aggregation
cites work: The Condorcet set: majority voting over interconnected propositions
cites work: Q5710169
cites work: Q3221403
cites work: Complexity theory and cryptology. An introduction to cryptocomplexity.
cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
cites work: Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
cites work: Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems
cites work: Determining Possible and Necessary Winners Given Partial Orders
DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.03.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6522435