The loan contract with costly state verification and subjective beliefs
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The loan contract with costly state verification and subjective beliefs
zbMATH Open document ID: 1331.91113
author: Carsten Krabbe Nielsen
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2015-12-28T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: w0918.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 6524398
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1855679385
cites work: A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions
cites work: Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
cites work: Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement
cites work: Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
cites work: On the structure and diversity of rational beliefs
cites work: On rationally confident beliefs and rational overconfidence
cites work: Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.10.002
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6524398