In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting.
zbMATH Open document ID: 1369.91019
author: Julián Garcia
author: Matthijs van Veelen
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2015-12-30T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92D15
zbMATH DE Number: 6524734
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary game theory
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2015.11.007
OpenAlex ID: W2141288980
Wikidata QID: Q57622197
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DBLP publication ID: journals/jet/GarciaV16
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2015.11.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6524734