Finite rationalizability and cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Finite rationalizability and cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
zbMATH Open document ID: 1328.91033
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(87)90157-1
author: Joseph E. jun. Harrington
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2016-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 6525195
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-1765(87)90157-1
OpenAlex ID: W1985107832
cites work: Finitely Repeated Games
cites work: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
cites work: Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames
cites work: Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
cites work: Perfect Nash equilibria in finite repeated game and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the constituent game
cites work: Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
cites work: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
cites work: Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
cites work: Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6525195