Information dependent games: can common sense be common knowledge?
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Information dependent games: can common sense be common knowledge?
zbMATH Open document ID: 1328.91013
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(88)90173-5
author: Itzhak Gilboa
author: David Schmeidler
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2016-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 94A99
zbMATH DE Number: 6525492
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-1765(88)90173-5
OpenAlex ID: W2120104019
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6525492