The logic of backward induction
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The logic of backward induction
zbMATH Open document ID: 1330.91038
author: Itai Arieli
author: Robert J. Aumann
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2015-12-22T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: dp652.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
zbMATH DE Number: 6523338
zbMATH Keywords: backward induction
zbMATH Keywords: common strong belief
zbMATH Keywords: perfect information
zbMATH Keywords: syntactic interactive epistemology
zbMATH Keywords: strong belief
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3122309279
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cites work: Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2015.07.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6523338