Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
zbMATH Open document ID: 1330.91005
author: Dirk Bergemann
author: A. Pavan
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2015-12-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91-06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 00B25
zbMATH DE Number: 6523556
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic contracts
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2015.07.018
OpenAlex ID: W1822083875
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Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design (DOI)
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2015.07.018