Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dynamic managerial compensation: a variational approach
zbMATH Open document ID: 1330.91096
author: Daniel F. Garrett
author: A. Pavan
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2015-12-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 6523559
zbMATH Keywords: incentives
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: adverse selection
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: persistent productivity shocks
zbMATH Keywords: risk aversion
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2015.04.004
OpenAlex ID: W2050772106
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2015.04.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6523559