Optimal auction design under non-commitment
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal auction design under non-commitment
zbMATH Open document ID: 1330.91103
author: Vasiliki Skreta
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2015-12-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6523561
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: optimal auctions
zbMATH Keywords: limited commitment
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2015.04.007
OpenAlex ID: W3125609476
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2015.04.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6523561