An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly
zbMATH Open document ID: 1330.91069
author: Katalin Bognár
author: Tilman Börgers
author: Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2015-12-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6523566
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: costly voting
zbMATH Keywords: participation costs
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2014.11.008
OpenAlex ID: W2039213570
cites work: Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
cites work: Q3594546
cites work: Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation
cites work: The communication cost of selfishness
cites work: Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
cites work: Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
cites work: Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?
cites work: Multistage Games with Communication
cites work: Q3576736
cites work: Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
cites work: Participation costs and efficient auctions
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2014.11.008
Recommended article: Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
Recommended article: Optimal Voting Rules
Recommended article: К оценке эффективности голосующих процедур
Recommended article: Efficient voting with penalties
Recommended article: Optimal coteries and voting schemes
Recommended article: Strategic voting when participation is costly
Recommended article: On the costly voting model: the mean rule
Recommended article: Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6523566