On the complexity of bribery and manipulation in tournaments with uncertain information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the complexity of bribery and manipulation in tournaments with uncertain information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1422.91225
author: Nicholas Mattei
author: J. Goldsmith
author: Andrew Klapper
author: Martin Mundhenk
published in: Journal of Applied Logic
publication date: 2015-12-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68Q17
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6524027
zbMATH Keywords: computational social choice
zbMATH Keywords: bribery
zbMATH Keywords: tournaments
zbMATH Keywords: ranking
zbMATH Keywords: uncertainty
describes a project that uses: PrefLib
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jal.2015.03.004
OpenAlex ID: W1978717786
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JAL.2015.03.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6524027