The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority
zbMATH Open document ID: 1328.91022
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(89)90225-5
author: Joseph E. jun. Harrington
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2016-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6525706
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-1765(89)90225-5
OpenAlex ID: W2073722044
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6525706