Asymptotic efficiency in principal-agent models with hidden information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Asymptotic efficiency in principal-agent models with hidden information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1328.91084
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(89)90081-5
author: Ben Lockwood
author: J. P. Thomas
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2016-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B16
zbMATH DE Number: 6525725
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-1765(89)90081-5
OpenAlex ID: W2003595208
cites work: Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction
cites work: Uniqueness of Markov-perfect equilibrium in infinite-time affine-quadratic differential games
cites work: Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
cites work: Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
cites work: Q3215459
cites work: Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
cites work: On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
cites work: Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
Wikidata QID: Q127065867
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6525725