The optimal design of rewards in contests
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The optimal design of rewards in contests
zbMATH Open document ID: 1329.91052
author: Todd R. Kaplan
author: David Wettstein
published in: Review of Economic Design
publication date: 2016-01-14T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6530257
zbMATH Keywords: contests
zbMATH Keywords: innovation
zbMATH Keywords: all-pay auctions
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
Wikidata QID: Q57921789
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10058-015-0179-4
OpenAlex ID: W3123855500
cites work: The all-pay auction with complete information
cites work: Contests with rank-order spillovers
cites work: Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
cites work: Optimal Contracts for Experimentation
cites work: Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
cites work: Q5323812
cites work: All-Pay Contests
DOI: 10.1007/S10058-015-0179-4
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6530257