Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests
zbMATH Open document ID: 1329.91021
author: Kris De Jaegher
author: Robert van Rooij
published in: Erkenntnis
publication date: 2016-01-27T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/231623
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6536009
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2138087154
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DOI: 10.1007/S10670-013-9465-0
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6536009