Dynamic club formation with coordination
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dynamic club formation with coordination
zbMATH Open document ID: 1391.91139
author: Myrna Wooders
author: Tone Arnold
published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games
publication date: 2016-02-03T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B99
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 6538827
zbMATH Keywords: club formation
zbMATH Keywords: cooperation
zbMATH Keywords: best-reply dynamics
zbMATH Keywords: Nash club equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: ergodic Nash club equilibrium
Wikidata QID: Q59973562
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: jdg.2015010
OpenAlex ID: W2790489165
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DOI: 10.3934/JDG.2015010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6538827