A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
zbMATH Open document ID: 0694.90098
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90005-5
author: Jeffrey S. Banks
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1990-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 4137555
zbMATH Keywords: two-candidate electoral competition
zbMATH Keywords: announced policy
zbMATH Keywords: sequential equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(90)90005-5
OpenAlex ID: W2001346959
cites work: Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
cites work: Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
cites work: Perfect sequential equilibrium
cites work: Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
cites work: Sequential Equilibria
cites work: Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4137555