Nonuniqueness of no-memory feedback equilibria in a fishery resource game
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Nonuniqueness of no-memory feedback equilibria in a fishery resource game
zbMATH Open document ID: 0696.90015
DOI: 10.1016/0005-1098(89)90100-3
published in: Automatica
publication date: 1989-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The paper studies a multi-agent fishery management problem where the harvesting agents (countries) have access to a common single-species fishery ground. The agents seek to determine their fishing effort rates so as to maximize the present value of net profits accruing from their activities over an infinite horizon. This set-up was first considered by \textit{C. W. Clark} [Math. Concepts Meth. Sci. Eng., Vol. 19, 117-132 (1980; Zbl 0444.90028)]. The solution concept employed is the ``feedback Nash equilibrium'' and the author shows that such a solution can be non- unique by constructing new (discontinuous) equilibria that appear for sufficiently low values of the discount rate. A prerequisite for obtaining this result is a symmetry assumption (all agents share the same profit function). An interesting feature of the ``new'' equilibria is that they allow a more efficient use of the resource than those equilibria obtained by Clark (loc. cit.). In particular, the use of the resource can be Pareto optimal if the initial stock of resource is sufficiently large.
reviewed by: Steffen Jørgensen
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B76
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B62
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A23
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 4141767
zbMATH Keywords: multi-agent fishery management
zbMATH Keywords: single-species fishery
zbMATH Keywords: infinite horizon
zbMATH Keywords: feedback Nash equilibrium
author: Veijo Kaitala
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0005-1098(89)90100-3
OpenAlex ID: W2039650695
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4141767