A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information
zbMATH Open document ID: 0697.90093
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90118-X
author: Lawrence M. Ausubel
author: Raymond Deneckere
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1989-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B62
zbMATH DE Number: 4143815
zbMATH Keywords: sequential equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: infinite-horizon bargaining games
zbMATH Keywords: one-sided incomplete information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4143815