Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice
zbMATH Open document ID: 0699.90006
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(88)90051-0
author: Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga
author: Joël Moulen
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1988-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 4147798
zbMATH Keywords: stability conditions
zbMATH Keywords: representability
zbMATH Keywords: binary game in constitutional form
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: collective choice rule
zbMATH Keywords: c-social decision function
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-4896(88)90051-0
OpenAlex ID: W2054357810
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4147798