Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
zbMATH Open document ID: 0699.90015
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90048-O
author: Drew Fudenberg
author: Bengt Holmstrom
author: Paul R. Milgrom
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1990-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B62
zbMATH DE Number: 4147807
zbMATH Keywords: Long-term contracts
zbMATH Keywords: optimal contracting
zbMATH Keywords: short-term contracts
zbMATH Keywords: recontracting
Wikidata QID: Q56481616
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4147807