Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0703.90108
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90083-V
author: Martin J. Osborne
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1990-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 4154256
zbMATH Keywords: repeated game of coordination
zbMATH Keywords: sequences of one-shot Nash equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto efficient
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Cooperation and bounded recall
cites work: Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
cites work: Finitely Repeated Games
cites work: A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
cites work: Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
cites work: Unanimity games and Pareto optimality
cites work: On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
cites work: Stable equilibria and forward induction
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(90)90083-v
OpenAlex ID: W2087637200
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4154256