Limit properties of equilibrium allocations of Walrasian strategic games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Limit properties of equilibrium allocations of Walrasian strategic games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0705.90008
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(90)90020-K
author: Yoshihiko Otani
author: Joseph Sicilian
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1990-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: We characterize the set of equilibrium allocations of Walrasian strategic games where each agent manipulates his strategic demand map to his benefit. We first show that, for a finite economy, the set of Cournot- Nash equilibrium allocations will be large and the equilibrium allocation map will not in general possess a closed graph property. Then we show that, with appropriate smoothness conditions and the regularity condition on the mean aggregate limit excess demand map, true Walrasian allocations in a sufficiently large economy can be claimed to be sufficiently robust against strategic manipulations of agents' demand maps.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 4158329
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium allocations
zbMATH Keywords: Walrasian strategic games
zbMATH Keywords: Cournot-Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: closed graph property
zbMATH Keywords: Walrasian allocations
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4158329