Dynamic programming and the secretary problem
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dynamic programming and the secretary problem
zbMATH Open document ID: 0706.90089
DOI: 10.1016/0898-1221(90)90145-A
publication date: 1990-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: A simple dynamic program is formulated and solved for the secretary problem in which one seeks to maximize the probability of hiring the best of N candidates who are interviewed in succession and who must be accepted or rejected at the interview. Numerical results for small N are given.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C39
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 60G40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 60C05
zbMATH DE Number: 4160507
zbMATH Keywords: secretary problem
author: Martin J. Beckmann
reviewed by: Howard J. Weiner
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q5653410
cites work: Finite state Markovian decision processes
cites work: Q3022029
cites work: Dynamic Programming and Decision Theory
published in: Computers & Mathematics with Applications
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4160507