Sequential path independence and social choice
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Sequential path independence and social choice
zbMATH Open document ID: 0707.90009
DOI: 10.1007/BF01395722
author: Elsie Sterbin Gottlieb
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 1990-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper proves that the existence of a dictator in Arrow's impossibility theorem can be established without invoking full path independence. It proposes a weak path independence axiom of a sequential choice procedure.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 4162596
zbMATH Keywords: existence of a dictator
zbMATH Keywords: Arrow's impossibility theorem
zbMATH Keywords: weak path independence
reviewed by: Graciela Chichilnisky
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01395722
OpenAlex ID: W2064946205
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4162596